On the Convergence of Fictitious Play
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the continuous time Brown-Robinson ctitious play process for non-zero sum games. We show that, in general, ctitious play cannot converge cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more than two pure strategies.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Oper. Res.
دوره 23 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1998