On the Absence of an Interface: Putnam, Direct Perception, and Frege’s Constraint1

hilary putnam and John McDowell have each argued against representational realist theories of perception and in favor of direct realist (or “common-sense realist”) alternatives. i claim that in both cases they beg the question against their representational realist opponents. Moreover, in neither case has any alternative been offered to the representational realist position where the solution to perceptual or demonstrative versions of frege’s problem is concerned. in this paper i present a transcendental argument that some of our perceptions of external objects must be direct in the sense that we perceive them and there is nothing else we perceive in virtue of which we do so. i also present a reply to standard objections to the claim that transcendental arguments can be used to support conclusions about the world and not simply about our own use of concepts. finally, i present a theory in terms of which the relevant frege problems can be solved without appeal to any of the sorts of representations in terms of which representational realism is defined.