Leakage Resilience against Concurrent Cache Attacks
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we show how to engineer proofs of security for software implementations of leakage-resilient cryptosystems on execution platforms with concurrency and caches. The proofs we derive are based on binary executables of the cryptosystem and on simple but realistic models of microprocessors.
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تاریخ انتشار 2014