Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research

نویسندگان

  • Yan Chen
  • Mark Bagnoli
  • Rachel Croson
  • John Kagel
  • John Ledyard
  • Bart Lipman
  • John Morgan
  • Vernon Smith
چکیده

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تاریخ انتشار 1999