Tenure-track contract helps self-selection

Tenure-track contract is criticized for curbing the incentives to expend effort after obtaining tenured status. Yet the most productive faculties seem to work on a tenure contract, and schools which aim to employ the best faculty seem to prefer to offer tenure-track contracts to their new recruits. I argue that tenure-track contracts are by construction more attractive to more able freshly minted PhDs, and therefore the observed sorting is rationalizable. I'd like to thank Dilijan Training and Research Centre of the Central Bank of Armenia for their hospitality during my stay when this paper was written. The usual disclaimer applies. Citation: Sergey V. Popov, (2015) ''Tenure-track contract helps self-selection'', Economics Bulletin, Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 2482-2486 Contact: Sergey V. Popov [email protected]. Submitted: June 08, 2015. Published: November 21, 2015.