A Behavior Model for Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper presents a behavior model of large repeated Bayesian games with an unknown number of players n, correlated types and imperfect monitoring. Each of the n players behaves as if she is negligible in a continuum game, but the game theorist performs a complete Bayesian analysis of what happens with such n players in the real repeated interaction. In addition to performing correct analysis of behavior often observed, the proposed equilibria escape well-known difficulties of Bayesian analysis and also include easy-to-work-with Markov-perfect equilibria. JEL Codes: C71 cooperative Games, C72 Noncooperative Games, and C78 Bargaining Theory
منابع مشابه
Large Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I: Compressed Equilibrium
Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent, and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of repeated large Bayesian ...
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