On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope. JEL Classification: C720.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 32 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004