Bargaining in Bundle over Multiple Issues in Finite-Horizon Alternating-Offers Protocol
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper provides an algorithm to compute the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies in perfect information finitehorizon alternating-offers bargaining in-bundle over multiple issues. We show that the agreement is achieved immediately and is Pareto efficient. We make a novel use of backward induction for multiple issues and we prove that, for linear multi-attribute utility functions, the problem of computing the equilibrium is tractable and the related complexity is polynomial with the number of issues and linear with the deadline of bargaining.
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