Competitive Search with Ex - post Opportunism By Pere Gomis - Porqueras Benoît Julien

نویسندگان

  • Pere Gomis-Porqueras
  • Benoît Julien
  • Liang Wang
چکیده

We consider a frictional market where buyers are uncoordinated and sellers cannot commit ex-ante to either a per-unit price or quantity of a divisible good. Sellers then can exploit their local monopoly power by adjusting prices or quantities once the local demand is realized. We find that when sellers can adjust quantities ex-post, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where the increase in the buyer-seller ratio leads to higher quantities and prices in equilibrium. When sellers post ex-ante quantities and adjust prices ex-post, a symmetric equilibrium does not exist. JEL Classification: D40, L10

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Global bifurcations, credit rationing and recurrent hyperinflations

This paper proposes an alternative explanation to recurrent hyperinflations other than bounded rationality by explicitly considering the global dynamics of an economy with credit market frictions. In this paper we show that hyperinflations are self-generated and are manifestations of the underlying global dynamic properties of an economy with perfect foresight rational agents that face credit r...

متن کامل

A geometric description of a macroeconomic model with a center manifold∗

This paper presents a unified framework of different algorithms to numerically compute high order expansions of invariant manifolds associated to a steady state of a dynamical system. The framework is inspired in the parameterization method of Cabré, Fontich and de la Llave [7], and the semianalytical algorithms proposed by Simó [13], and those of Gomis-Porqueras and Haro [9]. Within this metho...

متن کامل

Optimal Taxation in a Monetary Search Model with Informal Markets

This paper considers a search theoretic model of money in the tradition of Lagos and Wright (2005) where sellers can choose to produce in the formal or informal market. There is continuum of types of producers that differ in their managerial ability, as in Lucas span of control model. Producers in the formal market can make deposits and receive intererst payments, which makes credit possible fo...

متن کامل

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Search Theoretic Model of Monetary Exchange∗

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in decentralized markets are determined via Nash bargaining. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. More important, bargaining frictions may cause underproduction in decentralize...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2016