Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers

نویسنده

  • Masaki Aoyagi
چکیده

Under the optimal scheme identified in Theorem 2, the response by each buyer moves in the direction of the response dominant among their predecessors. In other words, a buyer accepts with a higher probability than his predecessor when most buyers before him have chosen to accept, and rejects with a higher probability when most buyers before him have chosen to reject. Formally, the following proposition states that when the state αt−1 > 0 as a result of many buyers having accepted, the expected probability that the next buyer accepts is higher than the probability that the current buyer accepts. Conversely, when the state αt−1 < 0 as a result of many buyers having rejected, the expected probability that the next buyer rejects is higher than the probability that the current buyer rejects.

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تاریخ انتشار 2005