Implicit vs. Explicit Deception in Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information

We explore bargaining, using ultimatum games, when one party, the proposer, possesses private information about the pie size and can either misrepresent this information through untruthful statements (explicit deception) or through information-revealing actions (implicit deception). Our study is the first such direct comparison between two ways in which people can deceive. We find that requiring informed parties to make an explicit statement yields greater deception than when information is communicated implicitly, particularly for larger stakes. However, allowing the explicit statement to be accompanied by a promise of truthfulness reverses this effect. In contrast with many previous studies, we generally observe very high frequencies of dishonesty. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.024 Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-70883 Originally published at: Kriss, Peter H; Nagel, Rosmarie; Weber, Roberto A (2013). Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93:337-346. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.024