Complementarities and Games: New Developments

نویسنده

  • XAVIER VIVES
چکیده

C are pervasive in economics, ranging from coordination problems in macroeconomics and finance to pricing and product selection issues in industrial organization. At the heart of complementarity is the notion, due to Edgeworth, that the marginal value of an action or variable increases in the level of another action or variable. Complementarities have been a recurrent and somewhat contentious topic of study for economic analysis. Indeed, while Paul A. Samuelson (1947) in his Foundations stated that “In my opinion, the problem of complementarity has received more attention than is merited by its intrinsic importance” (at the start of the section on complementarity, p. 183, 1979 edition), he later corrected himself in this very journal in 1974, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Hicks–Allen revolution in demand theory, when he stated at the very beginning of his paper that

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games ∗ Hiroshi Uno

This paper shows that every finite game of weak strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game if the action set of one player is multi-dimensional and the action sets of the others are one-dimensional; the implication does not hold, however, if the action sets of more than two players are multi-dimensional. Moreover, the paper proposes a new class of games of nested strategic co...

متن کامل

Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to industrial organization

This paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization: oligopoly pricing, comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two-stage games. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; L13

متن کامل

A characterization of strategic complementarities

I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot bestresponse dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show: 1. That generic 2X2 ...

متن کامل

Monotone equilibria in nonatomic supermodular games. A comment

Recently Yang and Qi (2013) stated an interesting theorem on existence of complete lattice of equilibria in a particular class of large nonatomics supermodular games for general action and types spaces. Unfortunately, their result is incorrect. In this note, we detail the nature of the problem with the stated theorem, provide a counterexample, and then correct the result under additional assump...

متن کامل

Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 a Contraction Principle for Finite Global Games

I provide a new proof of uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of global games. I show that the joint best-response in these games is a contraction. The uniqueness result then follows as a corollary of the contraction property. Furthermore, the contraction mapping approach provides a revealing intuition for why uniqueness arises: Complementarities in games generate multiplicity of equilibri...

متن کامل

Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited

Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns (V. Krishna, 1992...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2005