On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View

Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the ―New View‖ according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new...

Tracing Culpable Ignorance

In this paper, I respond to the following argument which several authors have presented. If we are culpable for some action, we act either from akrasia or from culpable ignorance. However, akrasia is highly exceptional and it turns out that tracing culpable ignorance leads to a vicious regress. Hence, we are hardly ever culpable for our actions. I argue that the argument fails. Cases of akrasia...

Ignorance is Lack of True Belief: A Rejoinder to Le Morvan

In this paper, I respond to Pierre Le Morvan’s critique of my thesis that ignorance is lack of true belief rather than absence of knowledge. I argue that the distinction between dispositional and non-dispositional accounts of belief, as I made it in a previous paper, is correct as it stands. Also, I criticize the viability and the importance of Le Morvan’s distinction between propositional and ...

A Problem in Avicennas View on the Origination of the Soul and a Reply to It

Author’s Reply to “A Note on the Simulation of Gas Diffusion in Capillaries and Porous Solids”