Concept Formation, Synthesis and Judgment: Kant’s Theory of the Logical and Cognitive Activities of the Mind

In the 20 century, Kant’s way of interrelating theory of cognition with metaphysics was considered as a particularly promising part of his philosophy. According to the Kantian approach, we take up a reflective attitude and refer to our own cognitive apparatus – we refer in particular to space and time as forms of intuition and to the categories. On this ground, one can argue for the following: No available object of reference can ever have features that contradict the constraints of this very apparatus. The considerations on logic and semantics underlying this project, in sharp contrast, were generally considered to be of no more than historical interest. There seemed to be no way of modernizing logic and semantics based on Kant’s own presentation of them. The reason for this widespread assessment is not only the fact that the traditional logic we find in Kant is considered to be a less powerful tool than the system of mathematical logic after Frege. For, at least parts of Kant’s presentation seem to attribute a different status to the logical sphere than we do nowadays. This status is entirely unfamiliar to us: The central topic of logic is the ‘actions’ of the understanding and their principles. Since we are dealing with actions, we can highlight the unfamiliar status of the logical sphere by drawing on the parallel to ethics. The actions governed by the principles of pure logic correspond to the actions of the pure “holy” will Kant discusses in the second chapter of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (AA 4, 414). The principles of logic spell out what the understanding does under ideal circumstances, that is, if nothing interferes with its activity. Adding empirically given, psychological limitations such as the limits of our memory or the influence of mere imagination corresponds to adding merely subjective inclinations in the domain of ethics. In the case of logic, one thereby derives what Kant calls “applied logic”. In relation to applied logic, pure logic acquires a normative status (see B78/A54). Neo-Kantians have argued on the grounds of the pure and normative status of logic that Kant’s theory does not fall prey to psychologism. Nevertheless, it is