Dynamics of the Nash Map in the Game of Matching Pennies
نویسندگان
چکیده
An iterative procedure for the game of Matching Pennies is examined in which players use Nash’s map to respond to mixed strategies of the other players. It is shown that even though the game of Matching Pennies is a game with a unique Nash equilibrium point, the iterative procedure does not lead to convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In fact we find that if the game is played using this iterative procedure then the successive plays of the game will follow an orbit around the equilibrium point. This orbit has period eight and it is the only periodic orbit other than the equilibrium point.
منابع مشابه
Stochastic Perturbations of Discontinuous Dynamics with Applications to Game Theory
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