Cooperation beats Deterrence in Cyberwar

نویسنده

  • Sebastian Schutte
چکیده

This brief article argues for a narrow definition of cyberwar and a technology-centric approach to understanding its strategic implications. Based on a review of the underlying technologies, approaches to facilitating peace in this rather new form of confrontation will be derived. This brief discussion already shows that Cold War era strategies such as credible deterrence through retaliation are ill-suited to serve peace in the digital domain. Generally, building offensive capabilities for cyberwar does not increase an actor’s security. Instead, geographically unrestricted security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957) of nationstates that employ similar technologies seem to serve individual security best. Sebastian Schutte, E-mail: [email protected]

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تاریخ انتشار 2012