Why do Clawback Provisions Affect Financial Reporting Quality? - An Analysis of Trigger Effects
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چکیده
We identify clawback triggers from firms’ proxy statements (Form DEF 14A) and use the likelihood of restatements to proxy for financial reporting quality. Based on a sample of 578 U.S. firms that voluntarily adopt clawback provisions during 2003-2009, when restatement-based triggers could be decomposed into two types: fraud and unintentional error, and we do observe the evidence that using fraud triggers is associated with high financial reporting quality. The findings support that fraud triggers can enhance deterrent effect of clawback provision by establishing a viable disincentive against fraud, misconduct, and otherwise harmful acts. These results are robust to controlling for the compensation components, to different sample specifications and to a number of sensitivity. Keywords—Accruals quality, Clawback provisions, Compensation, Restatements.
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