Quantity Flexible Contracts: Optimal Decisions with Information Updates1

نویسندگان

  • Suresh P. Sethi
  • Houmin Yan
  • Hanqin Zhang
چکیده

We study single and multi-period quantity flexible contracts involving one demand forecast update in each period and a spot market. We obtain the optimal order quantity at the beginning of a period and order quantities on contract and from the spot market at the then prevailing price after the forecast revision and before the demand materialization. The amount that can be purchased on contract is bounded by a given flexibility limit. We discuss the impact of the forecast quality and the level of flexibility on the optimal decisions and managerial insights behind the results. Supported in part by RGC Grants (CUHK4417/99E and NSFC/RGC CUHK10), a Distinguished Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from the Hundred Talents Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Currently visiting Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with a stochastic demand using quantity flexibility contract: a game-theoretic approach

  Supply chain includes two or more parties linked by flow of goods, information, and funds. In a decentralized system, supply chain members make decision regardless of their decision's effects on the performance of the other members and the entire supply chain. This is the key issue in supply chain management, that the mechanism should be developed in which different objectives should be align...

متن کامل

Coordinating a Seller-Buyer Supply Chain with a Proper Allocation of Chain’s Surplus Profit Using a General Side-Payment Contract

In this paper, seller-buyer supply chain coordination with general side-payment contracts is introduced to gain the maximum possible chain profit. In our model, the logistics costs for both buyer and seller are considered and the final demand is also supposed to be a decreasing function of the retail price. Since parties aim to maximize their individual profits, the contractual parameters are s...

متن کامل

Modelling and Experimental Testing of Asymmetric Information Problems in Lease and Hire Contracts (Based on Contract Theory)

This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), using library method, then we mathematically model different aspects of asymmetric info...

متن کامل

Product Market Competition and Optimal Debt Contracts: The Limited Liability E®ect Revisited

This paper shows that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers plays a crucial role in the existence of interactions between ̄nancial decisions and output market strategies. Lenders o®er an optimal, renegotiation-proof ̄nancial contract which resembles a standard debt contract. Computing Cournot equilibria, debt causes ̄rms to compete less aggressively: the usual (positive) limited ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2003