Vertically Differentiated Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
Full terms and conditions of use:
منابع مشابه
Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment
We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either singleor multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction st...
متن کاملCombinatorial Auctions in the Information Age: An Experimental Study∗
In private values settings, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism leads to efficient auction outcomes, while the theoretical properties of the Simultaneous Ascending (SA) auction are not well understood. This leads us to compare the properties of an SA and a VCG auction in an experimental setting with private values for multiple objects having complementarities. Statistically, we find littl...
متن کاملOptimal Strategies for Bidding Agents Participating in Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions with Perfect Substitutes
We derive optimal strategies for a bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We prove that, if everyone else bids locally in a single auction, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, provided there are no budget constraints. With a budget, however, the optimal strategy is to bid locally if thi...
متن کاملCore-Implementing Nash Equilibrium in the Vickrey Auction and Some Unstable Mechanisms
This paper demonstrates the Vickrey auction has a Nash equilibrium in the core. Generally, the dominant-strategy-equilibrium outcome of the Vickrey auction is not located in the core. However, a particular profile of truncation strategies is a Nash equilibrium, and it implements an outcome in the bidderoptimal core. The specified strategy profile is identical to that in core-selecting auctions ...
متن کاملLinear Programming and Vickrey Auctions
The Vickrey sealed bid auction occupies a central place in auction theory because of its efficiency and incentive properties. Implementing the auction requires the auctioneer to solve n + 1 optimization problems, where n is the number of bidders. In this paper we survey various environments (some old and some new) where the payments bidders make under the Vickrey auction correspond to dual vari...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Management Science
دوره 56 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010