Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider dynamic decision making in a legislature, in which in each period legislators vote between the status quo (previous period’s policy) and a new bill. However, the agenda formation process is captured by interest groups, that is, the new bill on the agenda is determined by an all-pay auction among these groups. We show that convergence to the median voter of the legislature arises if interest groups are patient enough but not necessarily otherwise. We characterize the bound on the speed of convergence in a family of stationary equilibria and show that convergence is faster if organized interest groups represent only one side of the policy space, e.g., are only right-wing or only left-wing.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 148 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013