The Shapley-Solidarity Value for Games with a Coalition Structure

نویسندگان

  • Emilio Calvo
  • Esther Gutiérrez
چکیده

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • IGTR

دوره 15  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013