Hume’s Perceptions and the Burden of Representation Throughout A Treatise of Human Nature,

Throughout A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume seems to suggest that some perceptions of the mind have the capability to represent, but he is not completely explicit regarding which perceptions are capable of representing. His account of impressions and ideas leaves some room to speculate about which perceptions can represent, and which possess intentional content: ideas are considered to represent, but are not intrinsically representative, and impressions may represent, but passions cannot. 1 Because Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas is by and large considered a strictly phenomenal one, the question of which perceptions can represent is frustratingly convoluted. In this paper, I will focus on impressions and argue that none of Hume’s impressions are capable of representing, due to the primacy of impressions and the gap between experience and reflection. Furthermore, I will argue that my position does not contradict Hume’s position that the only difference between types of perceptions is rooted in their force or vivacity. In order to do so, I begin by giving a short account of impressions and ideas, explaining the differences in types of impressions. I will argue that Hume’s account of idea formation and the passions renders it impossible for impressions to represent, and that representation belongs strictly in the domain of ideas. Once I have made my argument, I will defend it from the objection that ideas can and do represent, and since ideas and impressions are only distinguished by their force and vivacity, impressions also represent. Furthermore, I will defend my position against an argument that Don Garrett makes in his paper “Hume’s Naturalistic Theory of Representation.” Garrett suggests that moral and aesthetic