Non-emptiness of the alpha-core
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove non-emptiness of the α-core for balanced games with non-ordered preferences, extending and generalizing in several aspects the results of Scarf (1971), Border (1984), Florenzano (1989), Yannelis (1991b) and Kajii (1992). In particular we answer an open question in Kajii (1992) regarding the applicability of the non-emptiness results to models with infinite dimensional strategy spaces. We also provide two different models, one with Knightian preferences and one with voting preferences for which the results of Scarf (1971) and Kajii (1992) cannot be applied but our alpha-core existence result does apply. JEL Classification: C60, C72
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تاریخ انتشار 2010