Mechanism Design for Set Cover Games When Elements Are Agents

نویسندگان

  • Zheng Sun
  • Xiang-Yang Li
  • Weizhao Wang
  • Xiaowen Chu
چکیده

In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms, each of which decides, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For single-cover set cover games, we present a mechanism that is at least 1 dmax -efficient, i.e., the total valuation of all selected elements is at least 1 dmax fraction of the total valuation produced by any mechanism. For multi-cover set cover games, we present a budget-balanced strategyproof mechanism that is

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تاریخ انتشار 2005