Nash Bargaining without Scale Invariance
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چکیده
We present a characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution on a domain which is not closed under Scale Invariance. The characterization on this restricted domain relies on Symmetry, Efficiency, Translation Invariance, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Continuity, but does not require Scale Invariance. Surprisingly, without continuity there exist a wide variety of bargaining solutions that satisfy the remaining axioms.
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تاریخ انتشار 2011