A Choice for ‘ Me ’ or for ‘ Us ’ ? Using We - Reasoning to Predict Cooperation and Coordination in

This paper draws upon Bacharach‟s (2006) dual levels of agency to develop a model of how the circumspect aspect of we-reasoning functions for relevant games. The aim is to predict the extent of cooperation and coordination across a variety of game types. The model developed here yields a cost/benefit ratio threshold for players to choose cooperatively. Two experiments are run to provide data on some relevant hypotheses. The results of these experiments offer strong support both to the presence of circumspect we-reasoning and to our proposed model. # [email protected] Economics Program, UWA Business School, M251, 35 Stirling Highway, Perth, Australia. *Financial support from the Business School‟s precursor at UWA is appreciated, and to a UWA-administered Australian Research Council small grant. Thanks also to Paul Miller and Bonnie Barber for comments and to Dahai Fu for statistical assistance.