MARKET POWER IN TRANSPORTATION Spatial Equilibrium and Welfare under Bertrand Competition

نویسنده

  • Simon P. Anderson
چکیده

We develop spatial competition a la Bertrand for barge shipping along a waterway. Equilibrium prices are derived for two variations. For each case, we …rst give the perfectly competitive benchmark (when all modes are priced at marginal cost) before introducing market power on the modes. The paper emphasizes strategic rivalry (and market power) in two dimensions, and, for tractability, we consider each in isolation from the other. This gives rise to two variants of the base model. First, we analyze oligopolistic rivalry between barge operators and rail operators. The analysis indicates various ine¢ ciencies stemming from market power. In particular, the advantage that each transport mode has over some shippers gives it market power and so prices are not driven to marginal cost. More subtly, transporters’ equilibrium prices will tend to be overprice cost advantages (i.e., price di¤erences will be too small in equilibrium). In the second variant, we address rivalry among barge operators shipping from neighboring river terminals. Here, basic shipping costs increase with distance from the …nal market in a natural fashion in this setting. The model introduces demand elasticity in a novel fashion into a standard spatial approach by treating as …xed the shipping costs at the extremes of the market (this corresponds to shippers trucking directly to the market if they are close enough to the …nal market, and shipping to an alternative …nal market if they are far enough away). We thus derive the equilibrium for a “chain-linked”market system to show that operators with cost advantages parlay these into market size advantages. Welfare implications from transportation improvements are drawn. We break down the surplus changes accruing to di¤erent parties in order to indicate gainers, losers, and overall bene…ts. keywords: Market power, shipping price competition, spatial equilibrium, transportation networks We would like to thank the Navigation Economic Technologies (NETS) program for support. yDepartment of Economics, University of Virginia. zDepartment of Economics, University of Oregon, and Institute for Water Resources.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Bertrand-nash Equilibrium in the Retail Duopoly Model under Asymmetric Costs

In this paper, the Bertrand's price competition in the retail duopoly with asymmetric costs is analyzed. Retailers sell substitute products in the framework of the classical economic order quantity (EOQ) model with linear demand function. The market potential and competitor price are considered to be the bifurcation parameters of retailers. Levels of the barriers to market penetration depending...

متن کامل

Market Power in Transportation: Spatial Equilibrium under Bertrand Competition

We examine spatial competition along a waterway when shippers are distributed over space. Competition is between barge and rail companies and among barge companies. Equilibrium prices are derived for two variations: oligopolistic rivalry between barge and rail operators, and oligopolistic rivalry among barge operators with terminals located at different points on the waterway. In the first vari...

متن کامل

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria revisited

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria Revisited by Jim Y. Jin This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria with mixed products, linear demand and cost functions. It is found that a firm's price (output) need not be higher (lower) in Cournot equilibrium. However, given any number of firms and a mixture of complement and substitute products, every firm's price margin/output ratio is al...

متن کامل

Union Bargaining in an Oligopoly Market with Cournot-Bertrand Competition: Welfare and Policy Implications

We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the resul...

متن کامل

Biding Strategy in Restructured Environment of Power Market Using Game Theory

In the restructured environment of electricity market, firstly the generating companies and the customers are looking for maximizing their profit and secondly independent system operator is looking for the stability of the power network and maximizing social welfare. In this paper, a one way auction in the electricity market for the generator companies is considered in both perfect and imperfec...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2005