Frege’s Unofficial Arithmetic
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چکیده
Since a statement of number based on counting contains an assertion about a concept, in a logically perfect language a sentence used to make such a statement must contain two parts, first a sign for the concept about which the statement is made, and secondly a sign for a second-order concept. These second-order concepts form a series and there is a rule in accordance with which, if one of these concepts is given, we can specify the next. But still we do not have in them the numbers of arithmetic; we do not have objects, but concepts. How can we get from these concepts to the numbers of arithmetic in a way that cannot be faulted? Or are there simply no numbers in arithmetic? Could the numbers help to form signs for these second-order concepts, and yet not be signs in their own right?2
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تاریخ انتشار 2002