Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two- Stage Political Contests

Essays on Information Disclosure in Auctions and Contests

Supplementary Appendix for Contests for Experimentation

This section provides details for Section 4.4 of the paper. We consider the class of contests with intermittently-public information disclosure: the principal specifies a set of times at which the entire history of successes to date is publicly disclosed; at other times, there is no information disclosed. Formally, an intermittently-public disclosure policy is a sequence (Mt, μt)t∈[0,T ] where,...

Designing a Model and Explaining Persuasion Techniques in Disclosure Financial Reports by Companies with Job Acquisition Incentives Bias CEO

Increasing the regulatory environment and expanding the scope of the regulatory standards for financial reporting has, over the past few years, reduced the cost of representation and information asymmetry and increased the level of corporate disclosure of corporate financial statements. But one of the endogenous dimensions of quality that prevents the disclosure of financial statements is a mat...

Investigating the Effects of Large Block Transactions and Owner-ship Nature on Non-Financial Disclosure

Having adequate, sufficient and timely information and data is very important for investors' decision making. Processing information and allocating the asset are two fundamental tasks in the securities market and the stock price is more likely to have the nature of disclosure, information effectiveness and asset allocation efficiency. Thus, in this research, the effects of large block transacti...

Research Area Markets and Political Economy Research Unit Market Processes and Governance Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt Und Politische Ökonomie Abteilung Marktprozesse Und Steuerung Bidding in Hierarchies

This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter-and intra-group ...