Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Toward a unified theory of project governance: economic, sociological and psychological supports for relational contracting Witold J. Henisz a , Raymond E. Levitt b & W. Richard Scott c a The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3107 SH-DH, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA, 19104-6370, USA b Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Stanford University, Jerry Yang and Akiko Yamazaki Energy and Environment Building, 473 Via Ortega, Room 241, Stanford, CA, 94305-4020, USA c Sociology, Stanford University, Jerry Yang and Akiko Yamazaki Energy and Environment Building, 473 Via Ortega, Room 242, Stanford, CA, 94305-4020, USA
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تاریخ انتشار 2012