Future-oriented emotions: Conceptualization and behavioral effects

We distinguish between two kinds of future-oriented emotions (anticipatory and anticipated) and investigate their behavioral effects. Anticipatory emotions are currently experienced due to the prospect of a future event (e.g., hope or fear). Anticipated emotions, on the other hand, are expected to be experienced in the future if certain events do or do not occur (e.g., anticipated joy or regret). We discuss the theoretical differences between the two types of future-oriented emotions and examine their role in motivating goal-directed behavior. The results of a longitudinal study (n1⁄4 472) and a separate control group analysis (n1⁄4 340) provide consistent support for the convergent and discriminant validity of positive/negative anticipatory and anticipated emotions and their independent influence on goal-directed behavior. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Sometimes people fear that an undesirable future event may happen, or hope that it will not, and they imagine the behaviors that they can perform to avert the impending danger and visualize their relief or joy when the negative outcome does not materialize. All these affective reactions to future events may influence goal-directed behavior. This research is about the motivational effects of such future-oriented emotions, defined as affective reactions to future events. Although several researchers have speculated about the role of emotions in the goal-action cycle (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 2002; Lazarus, 1991), and even though some studies have investigated the motivational influence of specific future-oriented emotions such as anticipated regret and disappointment (e.g., Abraham& Sheeran, 2004; Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), we still know little about the different kinds of future-oriented emotions and their role in goal-directed behavior. More specifically, the present research aims to make the following two contributions. First, we build on recent proposals (e.g., Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003) to distinguish two types of future-oriented emotions. Although the distinction is implicit in earlier writings (e.g., Atkinson, 1964), only recently have researchers begun to articulate the differences between them. We will call the two kinds of future-oriented affective reactions anticipatory and anticipated emotions. On the one hand, a person may currently experience an emotion due to the prospect of a desirable or undesirable future event (i.e., hope or fear). These affective reactions are anticipatory emotions, because they are currently experienced due to something that could happen in the future. On the other hand, a person may imagine experiencing certain emotions in the future once certain desirable or undesirable future events have occurred (e.g., anticipated joy or regret). These affective reactions are anticipated emotions. To our knowledge, the current study is the first attempt to study anticipatory and anticipated emotions empirically and to establish their convergent and discriminant validity. rsity, Faculty of Economics and Business, Warandelaan 2, Tilburg, 5000 LE, The Netherlands. s, Ltd. Received 22 March 2007 Accepted 21 August 2007 686 Hans Baumgartner et al. Second and most importantly, we consider the role of anticipatory and anticipated emotions in goal pursuit and seek to establish their predictive validity. Although previous research has shown that each type of emotion can motivate future behavior (e.g., Abraham & Sheeran, 2004; Bagozzi, Baumgartner, & Pieters, 1998; Gleicher, Boninger, Strathman, Armor, & Ahn, 1995; van der Pligt, Zeelenberg, van Dijk, de Vries, & Richard, 1998; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004), anticipatory and anticipated emotions have not been compared in a single study, and their relative effectiveness in stimulating goal-directed behavior is thus uncharted. We report the results of a study involving two large samples of respondents to assess the convergent and discriminant validity of anticipatory and anticipated emotions, and to examine their predictive validity in goal-directed behavior. The context for the study was a major societal event, the millennium change of 1999–2000. ANTICIPATORY AND ANTICIPATED EMOTIONS ABOUT FUTURE EVENTS Although at face value, anticipatory and anticipated emotions are clearly different, the two concepts are, in our view, fuzzy sets for which no necessary and sufficient criteria of category membership are available (Fehr & Russell, 1984). However, we posit that certain features are characteristic of the two types of future-oriented emotions, which we will discuss in this section. These characteristics deal with (a) the role of uncertainty, (b) the phenomenology of the emotion, and (c) the range of discrete emotions subsumed in each category. First, anticipatory emotions are current affective responses to the prospect of future events that have positive or negative consequences (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Therefore, uncertainty about what is going to happen constitutes part of the meaning of anticipatory emotions, in the sense that the feeling of uncertainty per se partially causes the emotion (i.e., anticipatory hope in the case of desired events and anticipatory worry in the case of undesired events; see Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In contrast, anticipated emotions do not involve any uncertainty because they are based on the assumption, through mental simulation, that the future event has already happened or will not happen. The person imagines how good or bad it would feel to experience certain outcomes, given that the imagined future event has actually occurred. To the extent that likelihood comes into play, it is distinct from the emotion itself (‘How would I feel if X happened?’). This is similar to the distinction of valuation and expectation found in expectancy-value models. Second, anticipatory emotions are always currently experienced, phenomenologically real affective responses to possible future events that have positive or negative implications for the self. For instance, one may worry about the prospect of losing one’s job because of rumors of an impending plant closure. In contrast, anticipated emotions are based on pre-factual thinking about imagined positive or negative consequences. Although they could be real emotional experiences based on vivid visualizations of possible futures, often they are predictions, or affective forecasts (e.g., Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), about one’s future emotions based on imagined states of the world and their personal implications. For instance, one may visualize having just won the lottery and anticipate the joy one would feel in this situation, without experiencing other components of emotions such as emotivational goals and action tendencies (Frijda, 2004; Roseman et al., 1996). Third, the range of anticipatory emotions is smaller than the range of anticipated emotions. Anticipatory emotions are a specific subset of all discrete emotions that people may experience, namely, those related to the prospect of future events (expectant promises and impending dangers). In contrast, in the case of anticipated emotions, any discrete emotion that can be experienced may be anticipated in advance, based on a mental simulation of future outcomes. For example, a person may anticipate satisfaction when imagining a positive outcome, guilt when visualizing a blameworthy action, or regret when imagining a decision gone awry. Based on these distinctions, we propose that hope and fear are the prototypical categories of positive and negative anticipatory emotions, respectively (Ortony et al., 1988). Hope reflects pleasure about the prospect of a desired future event. Specific emotional facets are, for example, anticipatory excitement and feelings of optimism, confidence, or relaxation (Carver & Scheier, 2002; Ortony et al., 1988; Plutchik, 1980; Snyder & Lopez, 2002). In contrast, fear indicates displeasure about the prospect of an undesired future event (Lazarus, 1991). Specific facets include worry, anxiety, nervousness, and tension or stress (Averill, Catlin, & Chon, 1990; Ortony et al., 1988; Plutchik, 1980; Shaver, Schwartz, Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 685–696 (2008)