Constructivism and the error theory

According to the error theory, morality presents itself to us as though it were something to be discovered, but in fact it is not. Morality is something invented, constructed or made. According to constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. Thus understood, constructivism and the error theory are close philosophical relatives. Both views assert that morality is a construction. The error theory goes on to say that moral thought also aspires to something more, but does so unsuccessfully. Constructivism stops short of this claim. Which, if any, of these two views should we prefer? That is the question I shall address in this chapter. My answer will be that constructivism has the edge over the error theory in virtue of being committed to less problematic views about the content, truth and justification of moral claims. I shall not, however, conclude that we ought to believe in constructivism. In order to do that I would have to argue that the claims of the constructivist are more plausible than those of her competitors who claim that morality is neither invented, constructed or made. That is a task that goes beyond the scope of the present chapter.