Stability and voting by committees with exit
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society. JEL Classification Number: D71 Running title: Stability and voting by committees with exit Address for correspondence: Jordi Massó. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona). Spain
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 23 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004