SPECTRE: A Game Theoretic Framework for Preventing Collusion in Security Games (Demonstration)

نویسندگان

  • Shahrzad Gholami
  • Bryan Wilder
  • Matthew Brown
  • Arunesh Sinha
  • Nicole Sintov
  • Milind Tambe
چکیده

Several models have been proposed for Stackelberg security games (SSGs) and protection against perfectly rational and bounded rational adversaries; however, none of these existing models addressed the destructive cooperation mechanism between adversaries. SPECTRE (Strategic Patrol planner to Extinguish Collusive ThREats) takes into account the synergistic destructive collusion among two groups of adversaries in security games. This framework is designed for the purpose of efficient patrol scheduling for security agents in security games in presence of collusion and is mainly build up on game theoretic approaches, optimization techniques, machine learning methods and theories for human decision making under risk. The major advantage of SPECTRE is involving real world data from human subject experiments with participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).

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تاریخ انتشار 2016