The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper analyzes a family of rules for bankruptcy problems that generalizes the Talmud rule (T) and encompasses both the constrained equal-awards rule (A) and the constrained equal-losses rule (L). The family is defined by means of a parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] that can be interpreted as a measure of the distributive power of the rule. We provide a systematic study of the structural properties of the rules within the family and its connections with the existing literature. JEL classification numbers: D63
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 27 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006