Série Scientifique Scientific Series No 95s-11 INNOVATION UNDER THE THREAT OF STRICTER ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS

Série Scientifique Scientific Series No 95s-14 THE STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVES IN A MAJOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS OUTSOURCING CONTRACT: THE CASE OF A NORTH AMERICAN PUBLIC ORGANIZATION

Résumé We use agency theory to shed light on a complex, multiyear outsourcing contract between an important public organization and three major information services outsourcers. The contractual arrangement shows that innovative contracts can be drawn that reduce the scope of supplier opportunism. Nous utilisons la théorie des mandats pour analyser un important et complexe contrat d’impartition....

Série Scientifique Scientific Series No 94s-18 TECHNOLOGICAL PENETRATION AND CUMULATIVE BENEFITS IN SMEs

Série Scientifique Scientific Series No 95s-23 INNOVATIVE EFFORTS AS DETERMINANTS OF EXPORT PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF SPECIALIZED SUPPLIERS

Résumé This paper presents empirical evidence on the relationship between innovative efforts and performance on international markets for the specific case of small firms acting as “specialized suppliers”. In addition to tangible efforts such as R&D expenditures, intangible efforts are also considered. Results clearly identify specific innovative efforts as determinants of export performance. M...

Environmental Technology Licensing Under Emission-Equivalent Environmental Taxes and Standards

We use a two-stage game with an outsider patentee and n homogeneous firms to study the effects of environmental taxes and standards under an equivalent emission on environmental technology licensing behavior. Counter to the intuition, a stricter environmental policy hinders technology licensing since a stricter environmental regulation weakens the licensee’s payment ability. When the innovation...

Série Scientifique Scientific Series No 95s-3 CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN

Résumé This paper studies the implications of non-commitment for organizational design. An organizational form must trade-off between the coordination benefits associated with the centralization of information and its associated costs in terms of renegotiation. This analysis makes precise what these benefits and costs are. First, I characterize renegotiation-proof allocations for organizational...