Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's general impossibility theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 22 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004