Cooperation and Defection in a Generalized Modal Setting
نویسنده
چکیده
A modal logical schema is introduced for the exploration of a multi-player generalization of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which (a) each participant has at least k available moves, and (b) participants can be members of more than one coalition of successful participants. The methodology employed illustrates how the principle governing the aggregative behaviour of formulae within the scope of the 2 operator in the models for a class of non-standard modal logics can be manipulated to represent listcolouring properties for hypergraphs.
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تاریخ انتشار 2002