Judging How Heavily a Question is Loaded: A Pragmatic Method

The purpose of this paper is to improve the curriculum in the teaching of informal logic and critical thinking by throwing new light on a problem that is quite important in philosophy generally, and in the fields of statistics, political science and law, as well-the problem of how to evaluate loaded questions. The problem of dealing with fallacious or otherwise tricky questions has, since ancient times, been a subject of some interest to philosophers, and it is a complex problem, with many different factors that need to be taken into account. The subject is also of current interest in relation to recent concerns about the widespread abuse of statistics in polls that deceptively look precise because they are scientific surveys. But the results are skewed one way or another by effects of the wording of the question (effects not measured by the announced estimates of the probability of error). The problem here is that the connotations of the words used in the question can produce a large variance in the statistical outcome of a survey. In this paper, the factor studied is that of how to judge whether and how a question is "loaded," in a way that it is important for a critical thinker to be aware of, and to deal with by crafting a careful reply, instead of giving a direct answer, or taking a given answer at face value. In this paper, the method of judging how heavily a question is loaded is a method that is pragmatic in nature. The judgment is made by applying a normative model of dialogue to a particular case in which a question was asked. The normative model is prompted by the conversational context of the case, insofar as it can be determined from the question itself and the text of discourse surrounding it (as known in the case). The method is both normative and pragmatic in that it works by applying an abstract model of dialogue to the known particulars of question use in a given case. However, as will be shown, empirical tests (of the kinds used in statistical surveys) can be brought to bear as well. By studying some classic cases of the use of loaded questions of the kind typically cited in textbooks on logic and critical thinking, it will be shown how the problem with such questions when they are fallacious (and otherwise significantly harmful from a viewpoint of critical thinking) is one of conceal-