Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem with incomplete preferences
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چکیده
We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)’s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto indifference, social preferences are represented through a set of aggregation rules that are utilitarian in a generalized sense. Strengthening Pareto indifference to Pareto preference provides a refinement of the representation.
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تاریخ انتشار 2013