Composition as Identity , Mereological Essentialism , and Counterpart Theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
*Thanks to David Lewis, Michael C. Rea, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. 1Lewis, Parts of Classes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 81-87. Other defenders include David Armstrong (Cf. A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 12) and Donald Baxter (Cf. ‘Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense’, Mind 97 (1988), pp. 575-582); E.J. Lowe is at least a sympathizer (Cf. ‘Coinciding Objects: in defence of the “standard account”’, Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 171178).
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تاریخ انتشار 2010