Naturalism and Ontology: a Reply to Dale Jacquette†

For many years now, philosophical naturalism has enjoyed the status of orthodoxy in the Western academy; and it is widely recognized among theists as one of the most important sources of opposition to belief in God. In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I raised two main objections against naturalism. First, I argued that there is an important sense in which naturalism’s status as orthodoxy is without rational foundation. Second, I argued that naturalists must give up two views that many of them are inclined to hold dear—realism about material objects (RMO) and materialism. I also argued that naturalists will have a difficult time avoiding solipsism. If I am right, naturalism comes with some very unattractive commitments. In a review recently published in Faith and Philosophy, Dale Jacquette raises several objections against my book, ultimately concluding that its arguments are “myopic[ally] focus[ed] on easily, if not succinctly, defeatable strawmen.” Moreover, as Jacquette sees it, once I have conquered my army of strawmen (2004: 127), I “still [leave] the strongest contrary and sometimes most obvious opposing views untouched.” (2004: 127) Indeed, he alleges that I overlook at least one formulation of naturalism that straightforwardly “answers [my] main objections to naturalism.” (2004: 127) These are serious charges. If true, they make it difficult to resist his final verdict—that the book is “hard to recommend on its philosophical merits.” (2004: 130) The question, however, is whether any of these charges are backed up by anything even approaching decent argument. In what follows, I will show that they are not. Given the serious nature of the charges, one would NATURALISM AND ONTOLOGY: A REPLY TO DALE JACQUETTE†