Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
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“No Irish Need Apply”? Veto Players and Legislative Productivity in the Republic of Ireland, 1949-2000
This analysis fills an important lacuna in comparative legislative studies by testing the veto players theory against a newly constructed data set of significant domestic policy legislation passed in the Republic of Ireland between 1949 and 2000. Distinguishing between single-party majority, coalition, and minority governments, the analysis places into sharp relief the ways in which the unique ...
متن کاملComparative Political Studies Stephen Weymouth Exchange Commitments in 127 Countries Political Institutions and Property Rights : Veto Players and Foreign
What political institutions improve property rights? Building on the work of North and Weingast, this article argues that institutional checks on policymaking discretion (“veto players”) improve the property rights of investors regarding the value of the domestic currency. Veto players constrain the ability of policy makers to opportunistically pursue policy that may lead to a depreciated domes...
متن کاملFEDERAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY STABILITY: THE ROLE OF FEDERALISM IN VETO PLAYERS THEORY By
The veto players theory claims that there are institutional and partisan actors, individual or collective, that act as veto points in the process of legislation. Each veto point must give its consent for a new law to pass, thus altering the status quo. This study investigates the role of federalism, which is generally characterized by bicameralism and a decentralized state, as a veto player in ...
متن کاملVeto players and terror
Democratic regimes have been linked to terrorism for contending reasons, with some scholars claiming democracy increases terrorism and others claiming it decreases terror. Corroborating evidence has been used for both relationships leading to the following puzzle: why do some democratic regimes seem to foster terrorism while others do not? We offer an explanation based on Tsbelis’s veto players...
متن کاملEndogenous Property Rights∗
It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibriu...
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تاریخ انتشار 2000