The psycho-analytic study of thinking.

i. In this paper I am primarily concerned to present a theoretical system. Its resemblance to a philosophical theory depends on the fact that philosophers have concerned themselves with the same subject-matter; it differs from philosophical theory in that it is intended, like all psycho-analytical theories, for use. It is devised with the intention that practising psycho-analysts should restate the hypotheses of which it is composed in terms of empirically verifiable data. In this respect it bears the same relationship to similar statements of philosophy as the statements of applied mathematics bear to pure mathematics. The derived hypotheses that are intended to admit of empirical test, and to a lesser extent the theoretical system itself, bear the same relationship to the observed facts in a psycho-analysis as statements of applied mathematics, say about a mathematical circle, bear to a statement about a circle drawn upon paper. ii. This theoretical system is intended to be applicable in a significant number of cases; psycho-analysts should therefore experience realizations that approximate to the theory. I attach no diagnostic importance to the theory though I think it may be applicable whenever a disorder of thought is believed to exist. Its diagnostic significance will depend upon the pattern formed by the constant conjunction of a number of theories of which this theory would be one. It may help to explain the theory if I discuss the background of emotional experience from which it has been abstracted. I shall do this in general terms without attempting scientific rigour. iii. It is convenient to regard thinking as dependent on the successful outcome of two main mental developments. The first is the development of thoughts. They require an apparatus to cope with them. The second development, therefore, is of this apparatus that I shall provisionally call thinking. I repeat—thinking has to be called into existence to cope with thoughts. It will be noted that this differs from any theory of thought as a product of thinking, in that thinking is a development forced on the psyche by the pressure of thoughts and not the other way round. Psychopathological developments may be associated with either phase or both, that is, they may be related to a breakdown in the development of thoughts, or a breakdown in the development of the apparatus for 'thinking' or dealing with thoughts, or both. iv. 'Thoughts' may be classified, according to the nature of their developmental history, as pre-conceptions, conceptions or thoughts, and finally concepts; concepts are named and therefore fixed conceptions or thoughts. The conception is initiated by the conjunction of a pre-conception with a realization. The pre-conception may be regarded as the analogue in psycho-analysis of Kant's concept of 'empty thoughts'. Psycho-analytically the theory that the infant has an inborn disposition corresponding to an expectation of a breast may be used to supply a model. When the preconception is brought into contact with a realization that approximates to it, the mental outcome is a conception. Put in another way, the pre-conception (the inborn expectation of a breast, the a priori knowledge of a breast, the 'empty thought') when the infant is brought in contact with the breast itself, mates with awareness of the realization and is synchronous with the development of a conception. This model will serve for the theory that every junction of a preconception with its realization produces a conception. Conceptions