Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations

Sticking with Carrots and Sticks (Sticking Points Aside): A Response to Ventakapuram, Goldberg, and Forrow

Climate Contracts: A Game of Emissions, Investments, Negotiations, and Renegotiations

The paper presents a dynamic game where players contribute to a public bad, invest in technologies, and write incomplete contracts. Despite the n +1 stocks in the model, the analysis is tractable and the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium unique. If only the contribution levels are contractible, then investments are suboptimally small if the contract is short term or close to its expiration d...

International Control of Nuclear Proliferation: beyond Carrots and Sticks

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 40 Ronald B. Mitchell is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Oregon. His book Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance, published in 1994 by The MIT Press, received the 1995 International Studies Association Sprout Award for best book on international environmental politics. He has...

Corporate Wellness Programs: Implementation Challenges in the Modern American Workplace

Being healthy is important for living well and achieving longevity. In the business realm, furthermore, employers want healthy employees, as these workers tend to be more productive, have fewer rates of absenteeism, and use less of their health insurance resources. This article provides an overview of corporate “wellness” efforts in the American workplace and the concomitant challenges which em...

How to Commit (If You Must): Commitment Contracts and the Dual-Self Model

This paper studies how dual-self (Fudenberg and Levine (2006)) decision-makers can use commitment technologies to combat temptation and implement long-run optimal actions. I consider two types of such technologies: carrot contracts (rewards for ‘good’ behavior financed by borrowing from future consumption) and stick contracts (self imposed fines for ‘bad’ behavior). Both types of contracts can ...