The coalition structure core is accessible
نویسندگان
چکیده
For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive dominance relation which we call enforceable dominance is employed.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 48 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004