The Wholesale Price Contract Under The Framework Of Fairness-Preferencing Nash-Bargain In A Two-Level Supply Chain

نویسندگان

  • Yanhong Qin
  • Yanqin Li
چکیده

The paper establishes a fairness preference framework based on game theory of Nash bargaining, and builds a utility system about fairness preference. On the basis, we expeands the newboy model to behavior research. The analysis shows that because of the retailer and suppliers’ fairness preference, their optimal order quantities tend to became conservative, and the result shows that the greater the retailer’s fairness preference, the smaller the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the supply chain system, and the change tendency of the supply chan is more obvious than that of retailer. the greater the supplier’s fairness preference, the greater the optimal order quantity of the retailer and the supply chain system, and the change tendency of the supply chan is more obvious than that of retailer. Furthermore, we draw a conclusion that the wholesale price contract don’t change the supply chain coordination. Finally, we make the sensitivity analysis of the wholesale price, the retail price, the manufacturing cost of supplier, the stortage cost of retailer and the stortage cost of supplier.

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تاریخ انتشار 2013