Cooperation and Confl ict in the Social Lives of Bats

R.A. Adams and S.C. Pedersen (eds.), Bat Evolution, Ecology, and Conservation, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4614-7397-8_12, © Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013 Abstract To be evolutionarily stable, cooperative behavior must increase the actor’s lifetime direct fi tness (mutualism) or indirect fi tness (altruism), even in the presence of exploitative, noncooperative “cheaters.” Cooperators can control the spread of cheaters by targeting aid to certain categories of individual, such as genetic relatives or long-term social partners. Without such discrimination, cheaters could gain the reproductive benefi ts of cooperation without paying the same costs and eventually outbreed cooperative phenotypes. Here, we review evidence for cooperative behaviors in bats and the possible mechanisms that might prevent cheating. Cooperative behavior in bats is shaped by ecology, life history, and social structure. Altruism without kin discrimination is unlikely to evolve through population viscosity in bats because dispersal leads to low-average relatedness in the colony or social group. On the other hand, mutually benefi cial cooperation, often between unrelated individuals, is found in several bat species. Examples include social thermoregulation, male cooperation for defense of female groups, female cooperation for defense of food and pups, social grooming, and food sharing. Many forms of cooperation in bats likely involve both direct and indirect fi tness benefi ts. Some group-living tropical bat species provide intriguing examples of costly helping behavior between unrelated individuals, but the exact mechanisms that prevent cheating remain to be tested. Chapter 12 Cooperation and Confl ict in the Social Lives of Bats