Supplier Capacity and Intermediary Profits: Can Less Be More?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Elodie Adida Operations and Supply Chain Management, School of Business Administration, University of California at Riverside, 225 Anderson Hall, 900 University Ave., Riverside CA 92521, USA, [email protected] Nitin Bakshi Management Science and Operations, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, UK, [email protected] Victor DeMiguel Management Science and Operations, London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, UK, [email protected]
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