A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games
نویسندگان
چکیده
For 2-convexn-person cooperativeTUgames, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 39 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010